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The ways in which the activities of government may influence prices are so many
and diverse that only an arbitrary line will serve to set apart methods of more or less
direct control for separate treatment. A tariff may have objectives of protection, or
revenue, or both, but it is undeniable that it has important and recognized effects on
a given price structure. Policies of government in the realm of currency and public
finance may be undertaken with or without thought to prices. Here too the market
place may prove to be an all too sensitive barometer. Tax measures may have their
repercussions on what the consumer must pay for goods and often they are shaped
with full awareness of this. Subsidies and bounties and other measures to encourage
and facilitate trade and industry may seem to have little to do with prices but they
do reflect the public interest in bearing a share of the cost of rendering a given
service. When we come to the regulatory measures of recent decades the effect on
prices seems plain enough. The Supreme Court saw this clearly enough in a case
involving a workman's compensation act when it declared that the act requires that
"the losses shall be reckoned as a part of the cost of the industry just like the pay
roll, the repair account or any other item of cost." 1 The same may be said with
varying force of laws regulating the quality and standards of goods, hours of labor,
minimum wages, social security and the like. It is not to be supposed that government is unaware of the economic cost of its measures. The insistence of government
must be taken to be a choice between competing social and economic values.
There are many instances in which government acts with its eye directly fixed
on the forces that play on the market place and attempts to influence price by putting
the weight of its power on one or more of them, if not on price itself. Economic
man-he whose acts for his own good bestow good on all, so the story runs-is out
of hand. His conduct must be conditioned by new forces. Government steps in to
attempt to supply them. He may be so unruly that it is feared he will not perform
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according to the story and so government deals directly with price. There are
various other measures, too, that may be employed and, in the United States, government generally has been content to stay its -hand from direct control, important as
are the instances of its exercise, and to attempt rather to deal with other forces. It
is proposed here to review the story of the efforts of government along these lines
in the history of the United States. The primary concern will be with the measures
that have been employed as instruments of control and the economic, social and
political forces that have brought them about.
I. THE REVOLUnONARY YEmts

Price fixing laws of the revolutionary years may seem to belong to the remote
past but the fact is that for a time during those years prices of nearly every article
in general use, as well as the wages of labor, were fixed by most of the state legislatures. 2 This fact is a part of our heritage of governmental action and as such
warrants mention. The outbreak of the armed conflict and the activities of the
makeshift Continental Congress sent prices up. Without either a national treasury
or national'credit and without power to levy taxes the Continental Congress undertook to furnish the sinews of a successful revolution by the issuance of paper money
and the states did likewise. The states were supposed to redeem it by the use of
their taxing powers but taxation was a delicate matter at that time. The result
during this period was chaos in commercial transactions and in the market place.
The paper money fell in value until the expression "not worth a Continental" came
to be the epithet of the day. Unable or unwilling to deal with the disease the states
attempted to deal with the most apparent symptoms. Prices were out of hand and
so they sought to control them.
For some five years, from 1776 to 1781, this effort was made. As an organized
movement it dates from a meeting of delegates from Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Connecticut held at Providence in December, 1776. This
meeting adopted an elaborate schedule of prices covering substantially everything in
use at the time and recommended its adoption by the states. The Continental Congress gave its full approval and added its recommendation. The states were not
slow to act. By January of 1777 the four states represented at Providence had written
the schedule into their laws8 and before the year was out Maine, 4 Maryland,8
2BOLLES, FINANCIAL HISToRY OF THE UNITED STATES,'FROM 1774 TO 1789 (2d ed. 1884) cc. IX, XII;
Davis, The Limitation of Prices in Massachusetts, 1776-1779, in 10 PUBLICA77ONS oF TIM COLONIA Soc ETY
oF MASA HusErrs (1907) zig; Harlow, Economic Conditions in Massachusetts during the American Rev163; Jones, Historical
olution in 20 PUBcLImToNs OF THE COLONIAL SOCIETEOF MAsAc uSETrs (gg9o)
Development of the Law of Business Competition (r926) 36 Yta. L. J. 42, 52; U. S. DEr'Tr Aric., BuR.
Aciuc. EcoN., BsmuoGaoHxry No. x8, Price Fixing by Governments, 424 B.C.-z 9 26 A.D. (1926) 18 et seq.
aPrice control statutes passed by the states during the revolutionary war are collected in CLARK,
EMERGENCY LEGISLATION To DECEMER, 1917 (U. S. Dep't Just. 1918) 228-990. Massachusetts, Act of
Jan. 25, 1777, id. at 42o and amending act of the same year, id. at 429. Both were repealed later in the
year, id. at 439. The Massachusetts laws are discussed, in Davis, supra note 2. New Hampshire,
A,
op. cit. supra at 466, as amended by Act of April xo, x777, id. at 471. Both
Act of Jan. 18, 1777,
acts were repealed by the Act of Nov. 27, 1777, id. at 476. Rhode Island, Act of Dec., 1776, id. at 823,
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Pennsylvania,' and New Jersey 7 had done likewise. New York followed in 1778.8

During the ensuing years there were other meetings, other resolves and other schedules of prices. In some states the laws were short lived, in others they were more

lasting, but in all there was deep concern about the matter.9 As late as November
of 1779 the Continental Congress again urged the states to establish by law general
limitations of prices. A troublesome matter had been the difficulty of securing uni-

form action by all the states. Town was pitted against farm and everywhere the
patriotic utterances of the revolutionary years were mingled with denunciations of

monopoly, greed and avarice. A variety of legislation was passed. Laws against
forestalling and engrossing, so well known in England, found their way to the
statute books in nearly every state.' 0 Appeals to patriotism were joined with laws

making it a criminal offense to refuse to accept the Continental bills. In many states
barter was resorted to by the people.

Both the Congress and the states were caught in the web of the prevailing paper
money policy. Every effort was being made to give it currency in the markets in
payment for goods and as legal tender in payment of debts and taxes. The price-

fixing laws were but a part of this effort but like the other measures they failed in
their objective. They were generally disregarded and as soon as the credit and
currency of the new nation were established and there was an end to the chaos that
had prevailed during the Revolution there was an end to the price-fixing laws

as well.
and amending Acts of Feb., March and May, 1777, id. at 831, 833, 835. These acts were repealed in
Aug., 1777, id. at 851. Connecticut, Act of 1777, effective Nov. 12, 1777, id. at 228. In 1778, following
the New Haven meeting of representatives of the states, Connecticut passed a general price fixing statute,
id. at 232. This was suspended later in the year and finally repealed, id. at 240, 242. Other Connecticut
laws are summarized in U. S. DEP'T AoRic., op. cit., supra note 2, at sg; see especially the price fixing
Acts of Nov. ig and Dec. is, 1776, passed before the date of the Providence meeting.
'Act of May, 1777, see U. S. DEs'r AGRIC., Op. cit. supra note 2, at 25.
Act of June, 1777 to punish forestalling and engrossing and to limit the profit of retailers, see CLARK,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 293.
'Act of Oct. 13, 1777 appointing a Council of Safety with power to regulate prices, see U. S. DEP'T
Acuc., op. cit. supra note 2, at 34.
"Act of Dec. r1, 1777, see CLARY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 513. This act was suspended in June,
1778 and again in October and December, 1778, id. at 529, 530, 531.
'Act of April 3, 1778, see id. at 595. This was suspended by Act of June 29, 1778 and repealed by
Act of Oct. 28, 1778, id. at 6oi, 603. New York again embarhed on a policy of general price fixing by
Act of Feb. 26, 178o, id. at 636.
'See U. S. DEP'T AGRIC., op. cit. supra note 2, at xS, 15-27, 30-39, for references to changes in state
laws during this period; the statutes there referred to and many others will be found in CL.AR, op. cit.
.rpranote 3, at 228-990.
"Between 1777 and 1780 eleven states passed laws prohibiting engrossing and forestalling. Some of
these were passed as part of the price fixing laws while others were se'arate laws. Some were repealed
soon after their enactment while others were in force during the entire period and remained on the statute
books for some time thereafter. These laws are collected in CLARK, Op. cit., sup-a note 3, and are as
follows: Connecticut, 1777 and :778, at 228, 241; Delaware, 1779, at 257; Maryland, 1777, 1778, and
1779, at 293, 300, 317, 344, 370; Massachusetts, 1777, 1779, at 420, 441; New Hampshire, 1777, 1778,
at 471, 477; New Jersey, 1777, x779, at 513, 532; New York, 178o, at 636; North Carolina, 178o, at 68o,
689; Pennsylvania, 1778, 1779, 178o, at 708, 76!, 784; Rhode Island, 1776, 1777, at 823, 835; Virginia,
1777, 1778, 1779, 1781, at 942, 952, 96x,.983.

276

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

It is not surprising to find the states resorting to this method of control. Colonial
history abounds with similar measures." Assizes of bread had existed in nearly
all of the colonies.' 2 These, like their counterparts in England, involved price fixing.
The charges of grist mills were generally subject to public control.' Laws against
forestalling go back to colonial beginnings at Jamestown soon after i6o7 and at
Massachusetts Bay a little later.' 4 There is some evidence that the assize of bread
persisted in at least a few states after the close of the war and even for a few years
after the establishment of the new government in 1789.5 On the whole, however,
the new nation shook off its colonial heritage of restrictive price control laws and
gratefully gave up the unhappy experiences of the revolutionary years, for the
problems of independence were quite different. It was at this time, too, that the
laissez faire doctrines of Adam Smith, developed so systematically and rationally in
his Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, were taking hold of men's minds on both
sides of the Atlantic. It was in this state of affairs and of men's minds that the
United States set out to develop its untapped resources, supply the wants of its
people and take its place as a member of the farffily of nations. On every hand the
effort was to -protect the struggling young manufacturers at home, to encourage new
ones, to foster the American carrying trade by water, to settle new lands and, in
short, to build a self-sufficient economic unit.
II.

CONTROL'OF TRANSPORTATION

It remained for transportation to cement the bonds of the original union, and,
coincidentally, to afford a new occasion for the exercise of governmental control
over price. The waterways were, of course, the normql highways of an undeveloped
country but these were not enough and from 1794 to about 182o there was a mania
' Many of these colonial laws are summarized in U. S. DEP'r AoGIc., op. cit. supra note 2. We find
that in 1640 Connecticut fixed the price of corn for use in payment of debts, id. at 19; in 1758 Georgia
fixed the price of the work of tradesmen and in 1768 established the assize of bread, id. at 23; Maryland
had a series of acts fixing the prices of a large number of commodities for use in the payment of debts
beginning in 1692 and ending in 173o and in 1671 it fixed the prices of wines, liquors and other commodities, id. at 25; Massachusetts in 1659 fixed the price of strong liquor and in 1720 established the
assize of bread, id. at 27; Rhode Island in 1721 fixed the price of hemp and flax, id. at 35; South Carolina
in 1687 fixed the price of corn, beef, pork, tobacco and tar for use in payment of debts, in x695 it fixed
the price of liquor sold in public houses and in 1740 Charlestown fixed the price of building materials as
well as the wages of builders, id. at 37; Virginia fixed the price of tobacco as early as 1631 and continued
this in 1633, 1639-40, 1755 and 1758; in 1647 and again in 1755 it fixed the price of corn; in 1661 it
fixed the price of hides and shoes; in 1657 it gave bounties for the production of silk, flax, hops, etc., and
fixed the prices for those products as well as wheat and in 1665 and again in 1682 it fixed the price of
wheat, tobacco, flax and other commodities for use in the payment of debts, id. at 38.
Instances of general price fixing in Massachusetts going back to 1631 and 1634 are given in Jones,
supra note 2, at 45-46.
25
CLARx, HISTORY OF MANUFACTURES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1607-1860 (1916) 64.
' 1 Id. at 63. A Rhode Island law of 1779 appears in CL.R&i,op. cit. supra note 3, at 86o.
" See Jones, supra note 2, at 43-46.
'In U. S. D,'s- AoGRc., op. cit. supra note 2, we find reference to the assize of bread in Maryland
in 1785, 1789 and in Baltimore in 1794 and 1796, at p. 26; in Richmond, Virginia, in 179o and Alexandria
in 1798, at p. 4o; in New Hampshire in 1786, at p. 3o; in Georgia in 1790, 1796 and 1797, at p. 21.
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of road building. This was the era of the turnpike.' 6 Hundreds of turnpike companies were chartered by the states and thousands of miles of road were built. Government, both state and federal, played an important part in this era, but in addition
a large amount of private capital went into roads. That meant that the owners
charged tolls. It is difficult to learn to what extent tolls were actually fixed in the
many charters granted at this time but it is clear that they were fixed in some and
it would seem to be beyond dispute that there was ample power to fix them in all. 17
The turnpikes did not satisfy the growing nation. Even when well maintained,
and that was seldom true, they were costly, slow, and ill suited to the transportation
of bulky freight. Those who looked across the Atlantic found that England had
been in a great era of canal building from about 176o to the close of the century.
Canal building was given a great impetus in the United States in i8o7 when Albert
Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury, submitted a report advocating an extensive system
of canals and turnpike roads to be constructed by the federal government.' These
recommendations came to grief in the play of local forces and it was not until the
completion of the Erie Canal by New York State in 825 that we enter the era of
canal building. The panic of 1837 put an end "to it but in the meantime over 9o6
miles of canals had been built in New York State alone. Other states, especially
Pennsylvania and Ohio, rivalled its achievements. The federal government contributed some money for this purpose but the great bulk of it came from state and
private sources.19 Here again there was the problem of tolls and this time we can
state more positively that when charters were granted to private companies provisions were included fixing the tolls that might be charged, nor does there ever
20
appear to have been any serious debate as to the power to do this
In the same way that the turnpikes gave way to the canals in many sections so,
too, the canals were destincd to meet their match when the network of railroads was
finally developed, but the process was slow. From i84o until the close of the Civil
War the canals fully justified their existence and they prospered 2 ' but by the -beginning of the war some 30,000 miles of railroad had been constructed. This was
a phenomenal growth from the small beginnings in 183o but it was dwarfed by the
boom days of railroad construction that followed. By 1890 the railroad network
was i66,ooo miles in extent and the continent had been spanned many times. 22 The
effect of all this on economic life became apparent soon after the war. Before the
war the Mississippi River enjoyed a large traffic in the produce of the middle west.
"MEYER, HISTORY OF TRANSPORTATION IN THE UNITED STATES BEFORE i86o0 (1917) cc. I, II; FAULKNER, AmERIcAN EcoNoc HISTORY (1924) 31z-3i6; LARRABaE, THE RAILaOA QuEstioN (4th ed:

1893) 37.
Op. cit. supra note x6, at 68-70.
op. cir. supra note 16, at 313; LAuuAEE, op. ci:. supra note x6, at 33, 37-45; ME-R,
op. dr. supra note x6, at 135.
'Mo.rLToN,
VATERWAYS VERSUS RmLWAYS (I912) C. V; MEYER, op. c:t. supra note 16, cc. V-IX;
FAULxNER, op. dt. supra note 16, at 317-324.
'MEYER, op. dt. supra note 16, at 72.
'MouLToN, op. dt. supra note 19, at 69.
"LuuRarE, op. dt. supra note 16, c. HI; RIPLEY, RAILROADS: RATES AND REGULATION (1923) C. L
'MEYER,

"FAm.NER,
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destined for. export by way of New Orleans or for the eastern seaboard but by 1872
it was estimated that eighty-three per cent of this traffic went east by rail and by
1879 seven-eights of the produce of the trans-Mississippi states did likewise. In the
west Chicago had become the grain center of the country,2 8 and by the middle
24
of the '7o's five great railroads had direct lines to the eastern seaboard.
These were the essential economic facts which gave direction to the forces that
are summed up in the Granger movement of the late '6os and early '7os, in
which are found the beginnings that contributed in no small measure to the
final outcome, the subjection of the vast railroad properties of the country to
public control, both state and federal. First we must retrace our steps briefly. We
have already noted that it was the panic of 837 that put a stop to the mania of canal
building but by that time the public debt of the states was over $170,oooooo and
when this is compared with the figure of some $i2,oooooo in- i82o it is evident that
internal improvements, since most of this money went for roads and canals, were
undertaken with an easy hand in those years. When the bubble burst in 1837 many
states repudiated their debts and on every hand there was a desire to get out, and
stay out, of expensive public improvements.25 It was this circumstance, probably
more than any other, that resulted in railroad construction being carried on by
private corporations and individuals and not by the states or other public bodies.
The initial impulse came from private sources but the railroad fever caught quickly
and it was not long before the lessons of '37 were forgotten and public aid was extended with a lavish hand, even before the Civil War, to this new form of transportation. 26 In this period of construction the dominant impulse was the desire to
get railroads built and this, coupled with the growing power of the builders, overshadowed all else. The gospel of laissez faire economics was never more potent
and while there was a gesture of public control of rates in the form of a variety
of charter and franchise provisions and in some early general laws, these were never
more than a gesture.2 7 There was another gesture in the form of advisory commissions established for the most part in the New England states but these are best
described as permanent legislative fact-finding bodies. 2 8
We come now to the Granger movement 2 9 for it represents the first crystallization of any effective body of opinion that something should be done about railroad
rates and practices and, more concretely, that something should be done about them
for the benefit of the.farmers of thegreat middle and trans-Mississippi west. These
farmers grew articulate for the first time through the order of Patrons of Husbandry,
organized in 1867. While the order attempted to hold itself aloof from the partisan
mMOULTON, op. cit. supra note 1g, at 85-86.
FULKNER, op. cit. supra note x6, at 452.
2 Id. at 324.
'Id. at 332. After the war public aid was given on an even more lavish scale. Id. at 456.
a' MOSHER AND CRAWFORD, PUBLIC UTILITY RE.GULATION (1933) 14; MEYER, RAILWAY LEGISLATION IN
THE UNITED STATES (1903) Pt. II, cc. I and II, discuss the rate provisions of early railway charters and
general laws.
' MosHER AND CRAWFOw, op. cit. supra note 27, at 16.
SBucx, Tm GRANisoi MovamET (1913), is indispensable to any study of this movement.
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political arena it was an important rallying point for the forces that demanded public
c'itrol L; iailroads and as such it partook of the broader political movement. There
was something of repentance and frustration, stored-up anger and exasperation in
all this. Princely domains had been bestowed upon the railroad companies and
princely treasures too, and the farmer himself had made his contribution. In return
he expected speedy and cheap transportation of his great staple crops, wheat and
corn, to the eastern seaboard but speed and cheapness are relative terms. He made
no complaint on the score of speed but the new cheapness seemed unduly high.
There were rate wars that promised cheapness but these always seemed to end in
treaties of peace that took the form of pools and agreements; moreover, the rate
wars seemed to occur only at the competitive points where the contending forces
joined issue, and the sinews for the batde seemed to come from unduly high rates
at other points. To this discrimination there was added the rebate accorded none
too willingly to the big favored shipper and the farmer was not apt to be in this
class nor was he the beneficiary of the free passes distributed freely wherc they w'culd
do the most good. The stock market battles, the jobbery and frauds in connection
with construction contracts, the watering of stock, all these were foreign to him and
so he fastened his eye on what he could see closer to home and the principal things
he saw were rankly discriminatory rates and unduly high rates.
The Patrons of Husbandry, or Grange, reached its greatest strength in 1875 when
it had over 750,000 members from nearly every state of the union and as such was a
new and potent force in American politics. The so-called "Granger Laws" to control railroad rates are directly traceable to its influence. The most important of these
were passed in Illinois (869, 1871, I873),-' Minnesota (1871, 1874, 1875),"' Iowa
(x873, 1874),3 Wisconsin (1874, I875)" a and Missouri (1875)3 4 but there was agitation for control in nearly every state. In Illinois the grain warehousemen of Chicago
were also the object of a regulatory measure and in 1871 maximum charges for
the storage of grain were fixed by statute." It must not be supposed that effective
public control sprang into existence with the passage of these laws. Many of them
were drastic, like the Potter law of 1874 in Wisconsin. Many were largely ineffective
for efforts at enforcement were resisted and often thwarted. Almost everywhere the
railroad builders were powerful forces and in many states the laws were repealed
or sharply modified. But out of this period two important precedents were fixed.
The first was the acceptance by the Supreme Court of the United States of the
principle that there is power in the states to regulate the charges of railroads and
public grain warehouses together with the solemn statement, later repudiated, that
"For protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not
to the courts."3 6 T;.- second was the emergence of the mandatory commission
c. IV.
c"Id.,

I id. at 159 et seq.

2

Id. at 166 et seq.
'id. at 179 et seq.
uId. at 194 et seq.
'Id. at 134.
'Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. u13, 134 (876).
Other Granger cases are Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Iowa,
94 U. S. 155 (x876); Peik v. Chicago & N. W. R. R., 94 U. S. 164 (1876).
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vested with power to fix rates and control certain practices as the most effective
device for exercising public control.
Both precedents were important when the scene shifted to the Congress with
the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of z887. The political force of the
Granger movement had long since died down but other agrarian groups, notably
the Farmers Alliance and the Northwestern Alliance,3 7 had carried on the work
with equal determination. The Knights of Labor, the first national labor organization and a real power in the late '7os and '8os, went all the way and demanded
government ownership of railroads.3 8 New forces were making themselves heard
in politics. Independent parties were the order of the day as the leadership of the
old parties was challenged.
These forces found expression in the halls of Congress. There was agitation for
cheap transportation by government competition through public waterways and a
national freight railroad.8 9 In i874 the House passed the McCrary bill creating a
commission with power to fix maximum rates, but it failed in the Senate. 40 In' the
years that followed other bills were introduced and in 1878 one passed in the House
but the final impulses that led to the Act of 1887 came from the startling revelations
of the Cullom Report of 188641 and the decision of the Supreme Court declaring
state regulation of interstate rates to be violative of the commerce clause. 42 The

Cullom Report disclosed a sorry picture of unreasonably high local rates as compared
with through rates, unreasonably high rates at non-competing points, rank discriminations between persons, places and classes of freight, secret rebates, pooling
agreements, and the whole catalogue of prevailing abuses of railroad management.
The Supreme Court decision made it clear that if there was to be effective regulation the federal government must do its part, and it would be a leading one, for by
this time the purely intrastate haul was but a minor part of railroad transportation.
The result was the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. We must stop here, for the
story of experience under the original act, its frustrations, its amendments, and the
work of the Interstate Commerce Commission, is a long one.48 What concerns us
is that we find here price control exercised over the basic transportation system of
the United States and important among the objectives ot the original act were the
requirements that rates be reasonable, public and non-discriminatory. The last one,
a characteristic of all public utility measures, will make its reappearance in a new
form in more recent measures dealing with price policies in industry and trade
generally.
. Drew, The Present Farmers Movement (x891) 6 Poz. Se. Q. 282, gives an account of the organization and aims of these groups; BucK, Ta AGRARIAN CRUSADE (1920), is invaluable to an understanding
of this period, see especially cc. VI-X.
'See BEARD, TE RIsz op AmmucAN CtvazAmoN (1930) c. XXI.
"HA
Y, A CONGRESIONAL ISroRy op RALWAYS IN 7=s UmTrE STATEs, x85o-1887 (1910) c. XIX.
'SEN. REP. No. 46, 4 9th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886).
'Old. at 283.
"Wabash, St. L. & P. R. R. v. Ill., 1x8 U. S. 557 (x886).
OProfessor I. L Sharfman has to date published four volumes of a projected five on the history and
work of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
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III.

THE ANTI-TRUST MOVEMENT

The story of the almost fantastic growth of industry and trade from the close of
the Civil War to the end of the century has been told many times. 4 The United
States was the greatest free trade area in the world. With a constant development
of transportation facilities by water and by rail, regional and national markets -for
the products of the factory were developed on a growing scale. It was the age of
the corporation for by the end of the century three-fourths of the manufactured
products came from factories owned by corporations, great and small. Expressed in
statistics of iron, steel, coal, sugar, oil, copper, beef, pork, lead and other sinews of
modern industrialism, the results are indeed impressive. Expressed in terms of
human and social values, there is not so much to be said. There were many new
millionaires, lords of great financial and industrial domains, but there were multitudes who knew only the long hours of labor, the all too scant pay, and the squalor
of the new urban and industrial order.
We have already referred to the agrarian movement of the '70s and its results
in the railroad legislation of the middle west. In 1876 it entered the national
political scene and, as the Greenback party, polled some 8o,ooo votes for its candidate for President. In i88o it polled 308,578 votes and in 1884, 175,370 votes but that
was the end of the party 45 The Greenback party was a movement of agrarian
disccntent and protest but its specific for the farmer's troubles was inflation of the
currency though there was always a strong flavor of anti-railroad and anti-monopoly
in its platforms. 6 In the late '8os there was a ferment of organization of agrarian
groups. The most powerful of these was The National Farmers Alliance and
Industrial Union which claimed a membership of 3,000,000 in I89o.47 At the elections of that year it secured one Senator and forty-four Representatives pledged to
• 'pport its demands4
In the field of labor, too, the workingman was making
the beginnings of organization on a national scale. In 1875 the Knights of Labor
was organized and by 1885 it was strong enough to cripple the Gould railroads
with a strike. The following year the American Federation of Labor was organized.49 All of these groups were important forces by 189o and at the election of
1892 they rallied under the banner of the People's party and polled over a million
votes. 5 0
The leadership of the old parties was put on the defensive as these portents came
from the west. The old parties were engaged in a contest over what principle
should govern tariff legislation and the national election of i888 was fought on the
"This story is well told in BEARD, op. cit. s., --a note 38, c. XX.
"BRuCE, AMERICAN PARTIES AND POL'-CS t3d ed. 1936) 118, 137.
"McKEE, THE NATIONAL CONVENTIONS P . PLATFORMS OF ALL POLITICAL PARTIES, 1789-1901 (19o)
191, 215.
"DREw, o,. cit supra note 37; BucK, op. cit. supra note 37.
" Bucv, id. at 133.
8
" See BEtRD, op. cit. supra note 38, C. XXI; 2 COMMONS, HISTORY OF L.EOUR IN THE UNITED STATES
(1926) 362.
' BRuCE, op. cit. supra note 45, at 137.
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issue of a tariff for revenue as against a tariff for protection. This was the basic

issue and while both major parties, as well as the independent parties, had antitrust planks in their platforms for the first time,51 they did not figure as issues in
the campaign except perhaps as the Democrats charged that the protection principles
52
of the Republicans tended to foster and protect trusts and combinations.
That there were trusts, pools and combinations in the new industrial order was
evident by this time. The Standard Oil Trust (1882), the Cotton-Seed Oil Trust
(1884), the Linseed Oil Trust (1885), the National Lead Trust (i887), the Whiskey
Trust (887), the Sugar Trust (887) and the Diamond Match Company (1889)
were the most important 5 3 Apart from the trust proper it was charged that industry was honeycombed with pools, gentlemen's agreements to fix prices and limit
production, and exclusive selling agencies to market the products of competitors, all
designed to limit competition and control prices.&5 4 The reports of investigating
committees had brought most of this before the public.5" The Cullom Report of
1886 had exposed the part played by discriminatory railroad-rates and rebates in
56
the building of the new economic empires.
These revelations had had some effect in the states and before July 2, x89o, the
date of the Sherman Act, twenty-one states, mostly in the south and middle and
far west, had written into their constitutions, or statutes, or both, prohibitions against
"monopoly" and "restraint of trade" in one form or another.57 But the trusts at
this time were national in their scope and state laws could do little about them and
little was attempted.
When we turn to the passage of the Sherman Act by the Congress it is difficult to
find that that body was responding to an aggressive public demand that something
be done about "the trust problem." The national campaign of i888 had been fought
on the tariff issue, as we have noted, and the Congress of 1890 devoted most of its
time and attention to the passage of the McKinley Tariff Act of i89o, an act that
for the first time was based largely on the principle of protection.
The agrarian
forces marshalled their strength in opposition to it but the best they could get was
protection for farm products that was neither wanted nor needed and the passage
1

McKEE, op. cit. supra note 46, at 235, 241, 247, 251.
and equivocal anti-trust plank in its platform. Id. at 2o6.
'Id. at 235.
' SEAGER. AND GuLICK, TRUST AND ConpoRAloN PRoBT1.E

The Democratic party in 1884 had a mild

(1929) 49.60; JONaS, Tn Tkus-r PNoaxzu

IN TBE UNIED STATES (1928) C.III.

"Id. c. I.
In 888 a committee of the New York Senate brought to light facts about the sugar trust and other
combinations, N. Y. SEN. Doc. No. 50 (z888); two reports were submitted in x888 by a House committee
which had investigated the oil, sugar, whiskey and cotton-bagging combinations but the report was
poorly presented and contained no recommendations for. legislation. H. R. Raw. No. 3112, 5oth Cong.,
ist Sess. (x888); H. R. REP. No. 465, 50th Cong., 2d Sess. (1889).
"Supra note 4I; the earlier Windom Committee rcpjrt of 1874 had contained similar facts. SEN. Ra.
No. 307, 43d Cong., ist Sess. (1874).
Snaoaa AND GuLicy, op. ct. supra note 53, c. XVI.
TAuuo, TuE Tvai'F
s-inHrr or THE UNmE STATEs (1923) c. V.
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of the Silver Purchase Act, an act that was but a halting step in the direction of the
currency measures that they were advocating.
It is difficult, too, to escape the conclusion that the Sherman Act fits in the same
category."0 In the Senate the vote was 52 to I- In the House it was unanimous.
There was little debate in either body. In the Senate it took up only five days at
different times while in the House it is hard to find more than one day devotied to
this subject.6 0 There was public knowledge of the existence of trusts and their
practices but it had not been translated into any aggressive demand for legislation.
There was another issue that was in the forefront and it was the tariff. The Sherman Act would be a simple answer to those who denounced the tariff as a measure
that would enrich the trusts and foster higher prices. The unanimity with which
it became law makes the Act seem to be little more than a measure to appease the
growing unrest in the farming and industrial regions. Senator Platt of Connecticut
took that view of the matter when he characterized the proceedings in the Senate
as not "in the line of the honest preparation of a bill to prohibit and punish trusts.
It has been in the line of getting some bill with that title that we might go to the
country with.' 1
The debates are of little help in shedding light on the precise meaning of the
law. It was Mr. Justice Peckham who summed the matter up when he declared that
"all that can be determined from the debates and reports is that various members
had various views."162 The general language of the law was an invitation to debate

and controversy as to its meaning and effects and, in the hands of lawyers and
judges, that controversy still persists. The economics of the Sherman Act may be
simply stated. Monopolies and attempts to monopolize are proscribed and so are
conti acts and combinations in "restraint of trade." There is here a legislative attemp to protect a system of competition against the operation of forces that would
tend to deft: oy it. This involves a conception of a norm of competition which when
operative would insure fair prices to the consumer and fair profits to the producer.
The preservation of the automatism of free competition, enforced by government,
was the great objective. It is noteworthy that with the precedent of the railroad
law so fresh in its mind the Congress en trusted its broad mandate to the judges
rather than to an administrative body charged with responsibility for endowing it
with meaning in the first instance.
Until after the turn of the century the story of the Sherman Act is not that of
a law passed in response to an insistent public demand. It fairly languished on the
statute books. President Harrison was in office for close to three years after he
approved the Sherman Act on July 2, 189o yet these years are barren of any effective
BucK, op. cit. supra note 37, at 132.
KNAuTH, THE PoLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARDS INDUSTRIAL MONOPOLY (1914) C. 11: CLARK,
TIlE rLDERAL TRUST PoLcY (193) c. III; SEAGER AND GULICK, op. di. supra note 53, at 372-373.
"'As quoted in BEARD, CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN HISTORY, 1877-1913 (1914) 136. See also 2!
CONG. REc. 2729 (891).

'U. S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n; x66,U. S. 290, 318 (0897).
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steps against the well known trusts. 6 3 An indictment against the Whiskey Trust

was found to be faulty and was quashed and at the close of the administration a
bill in equity was filed against the Sugar Trust. A suit against the Trans-Missouri
Freight Association, involving an agreement as to rates among a group of railroads,
was unsuccessful in the lower courts though the United States won in the Supreme
Court during the administration of President Cleveland. The record of the second
Cleveland administration is little better. 64 The suit against the Sugar Trust was
decided by the Supreme Court in 1895 and it was a complete victory for the trust.66
There was a little comfort in the success of the suit against the Trans-Missouri
Freight Association,6 6 and this was confirmed in a later decision in a similar suit
against the Joint Traffic Association. 7 But these successes were gained by a 5 to 4
vote in the Trans-Missouricase and a 5 to 3 vote in the Joint Traffic case while the
defeat in the Knight case had provoked only one dissent. There is little more to be
said about the McKinley administration. There was a unanimous victory in the
suit instituted under Cleveland against the Cast Iron Pipe combination, and that
is all.68

A law passed in response to an insistent popular demand does not lie idle on the
statute books for ten years, as this one had, while the objects against which it is
directed gain in number and size and power, yet that is precisely what had happened. The Knight case of 1895 seemed to remove any obstacle to combination that
the Sherman Act might have presented and this, together with the defeat of Bryan
in 1896, the Dingley tariff of 1897 and an era of business prosperity that followed,
were all factors favorable to the further development of the trust movement. In
these years combinations generally made use of the holding company device. The
new combinations were organized on a gigantic scale, the biggest of all being the
billion dollar Steel Trust of o901.69
During the administrations of Theodore Roosevelt and Taft there was far
greater activity in the enforcement of the Sherman Act than there had ever been
before.1 0 The victory of the United States in the Northern Securities case in 1904, 71
even though the Court was almost as badly divided in its reasons as it was in its
votes, was enough to shake the faith of the trust organizers in the immunity of the
' The record of the Harrison administration is reviewed in WALKER, HisroRy o
(1910) C. IV.

THE SHERMANt LAW

-,U.S. v. E. C. Knight Co., x56 U. S. 1 (1895).
V.
v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, x66 U. S. 29o (1897).
v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U. S. 505 (1898).
v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 175 U. S. 211 (1899); Wu.sR, op. cit. supra note 63, c. VI.
' SEAGER Asrn Guicx, op. cit. supra note 53, c. V, describes the movement during this period; see
also BEARD, op. cit. supra note 61, c. IX.
"°During the Roosevelt administrations there were brought 18 bills in equity, 25 indictments and one
forfeiture proceeding. President Taft outdid this, his administration bringing 46 bills in equity, 43 indictments and one contempt proceeding. A list of cases instituted by the United States under the anti-trust
laws during the different administrations will be found in THE FEDERAL ANumRusr LAws (U. S. Gov't
Printing Office, 1928).
'Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S. 197 (I904). The court split five to four, and four
opinions were delivered.
"Id.
'U.
°'U.
e'U.

c.
S.
S.
S.
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holding company device and there was a definite halt in the movement. The
73
72
sweeping victories seven years later in the Standard Oil and American Tobacco
cases brought with them the labored enunciation of the "rule of reason" by Chief
Justice White. With all its vagaries it still stands as the accepted reading of the
Sherman Act. The rule did not, however, gain ready acceptance for a Senate committee in 1913 reported that this rule made it "imperative to enact additioral legislation." The committee found itself "unwilling to repose in the Supreme Court, or
ani other court, the vast and undefined power which it must exercise in the admin74
istration of the statute under the rule which it has promulgated.
In spite of this attitude the "rule of reason" survived the attempt to change it
and the final legislative products, the Clayton Act 75 and the Federal Trade Commission Act,76 represented a reaffirmance of the basic faith of the Sherman Act.
They differed not at all from the Sherman Act in their purposes but only in the
methods to be pursued to achieve the common objective.7 7 Both were designed to
implement the earlier law. It was believed that certain practices were so generally
the tools of incipient monopoly that the proscription of those practices would halt
the fruition of monopoly and restraint of trade. It was believed that government
would act more effectively if it could step in and check certain practices than if it
must wait until its only recourse was to seek to dissolve the trust at the height of
its power. It is in this connection that the prohibition against the discriminatory
price first made its appearance in federal anti-trust law in Section 2 of the Clayton
Act. It was designed to check the elimination of a competitor by local price cutting.
The objective here is quite different from that of the typical public utility law.
The latter, with its requirements that rates be non-discriminatory and be published

and adhered to, imposes a substantially uncompromising one-price policy on the
uti!'ty whereas the anti-trust flavor injected into the Clayton Act marks a definite
compromise with that idea.
To sum up, the basic faith in all this anti-trust legislation was a faith in the
automatism of free competition. If this could be preserved by government, the
merits of the system, so convincingly set out in 1776 by Adam Smith in his Wealth
.Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. U. S.,221 U. S. 1 (1911).
"U. S. v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. io6 (1911).
'S.

RP. No. 1326, C2d Cong., 3d Sess. (913).

1338 STAT. 730 (1914), I5 U. S. C. §13.

7838 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §41.

' 1The statement in the text must be confined to the legislative purpose behind these laws. See
HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1924) C. 1; CLAIx, THE FEDERAL TRUST POLICY (931)
c. VIII; Montague, The Federal Trade Commission and the Clayton Act in SoMaE LEGAL PHASES OF
CoRoRAm FINANCING, REOGRANIZATON AND REGULATION (1917); Handler, The Jurisdiction of the
Fede -a Trade Commission over False Advertising (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 527. The judicial view as to

the purpose of the Federal Trade Con mission Act is clearly expressed by Mr. Justice Sutherland in F. T. C.
v. Faladam, 283 U. S. 643, 650 (193:1), and by Mr. Justice Brandeis (dissenting) in F. T. C. v. Gratz, 253
U. 5. 421, 434 (1920). It must be recognized that many of the practices challenged by proceedings
under this legislation have had little, if anything, to do with the practices that motivated the legislation;
as to the Federal Trade Commission, see Handler, supra, and as to §2 of the Clayton Act, see McAllister,
Sales Policies and Price Discrimination under.the Clayton Act (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 518, but this does
not invalidate the statement as to legislative purpose.
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of Nations, would work. It is in this sense only that anti-trust laws involve control
of price. There is here no direct control by government. It is only by indirection,
by seeking to maintain conditions of competition, that government makes itself felt
in the market place.
PRlcx CONTROL: 1907-X929
It is to the expanding field of public utilities that one must turn for direct control
of price. The early Granger decisions of the Supreme Court in 1876, particularly
Munn v. Illinois,78 contained in them the recognition of state power to regulate the
charges of public utilities but it was' not until 1907 that the movement began for
further state regulation. At that time gas and electricity were coming to be the
household necessities that they are today. With the monopoly that was necessarily
enjoyed by the owners of the pipes and wires there came direct control of price, and
in 1907 New York under Governor Hughes and Wisconsin under Governor La
Follette enacted laws creating state public service commissions with broad powers
to regulate. the charges of public utilities. In the selection of the commission
method of control there is a further reminder of the pioneer Granger railroad laws.
The movement spread rapidly and within six years twenty-two states had created
commissions with varying powers over different kinds of utilities. It was at this
time, too, that state control of insurance first made its appearance.80 Today only
Delaware is without such a commission. The list of utilities subject to public control has grown from the railroads, warehouses, and grain elevators of the Granger
days to include electric light and power, gas, street and interurban railways, telephone
and telegraph, motor vehicle carriers, water works, pipe lines and heating plants.8 '
In all of this legislative price control there is the necessary corollary that prices be
non-discriminatory.
During the World War the United States undertook a broad policy of price
fixing. Prices were fixed for basic raw materials such as iron ore, copper, lumber,
coal, zinc, sulphuric acid and many consumption necessaries such as sugar, flour and
raisins. The necessities of the war brought this about and price fixing ended with
the Armistice. 8 2 The rent law of New York and similar Congressional action for
the District of Columbia were a part of the war movement.83 In 1919, as an aftermath of war conditions, Montana underto6k to vest in a state commission power
to fix the price of all commodities but this effort ran afoul of constitutional argu84
ments and was short lived.
IV. EXTENSION AND RESTRICTION oF Dnitcr

"Supra note 36.
' This movement is reviewed in Mosam mm CRAwFoRD, op. cit. supra note 27, C. II.
(sustained the constitutionality of the
'German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389 (914)

Kansas law).
rAND
CRAwFoRD, op. cit. supra note 27, c. IL.
I Mos
' See Haney, Price Fixing in the United.States during the War (1919) 34 POL. Scl Q. 104, 262, 434.
'Block v. Hirsch, 256 U. S. 135 (1921); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. x7o
(1921).

'Holter Hardware Co. v. Boyle, 263 Fed. 134 (D. Mont.
257 U. S. 666 (192o), 33 H.uv. L. REv. 838.

1920),

appeal dismissed on stipulation
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The Packers and Stockyards Act of I9218r was the result of years of fruitless
agitation, investigation and efforts to enforce the anti-trust laws. From 1918 to I92O
the Federal Trade Commission released a series of reports of its turbulent investigation of the meat packers and thereafter the demand for special legislation would not
down. 80 The law itself was little more than a codification of anti-trust matters with
special reference to the practices prevailing in the meat packing and stockyards businesses. The only departure from orthodox anti-trust policy was in the power vested
in the Secretary of Agriculture to fix the maximum charges for the services of stockyards. 87 This was direct price fixing and to that extent represented a departure
from the tenets of the Sherman Act. It was evident to the investigators and the
Congress that competition played no part in the fixing of these charges.
Before considering the recent price control legislation of the depression years it
remains but to record the price fixing attempts of the 192os that make up the Index
Expurgatorius of the Supreme Court. They include the charges of theatre ticket
agents,8 8 employment agents,8 9 gasoline, 90 and ice.91 How these matters came to
be on this Index has been discussed elsewhere.0 2 Its existence lends point to other
and indirect methods of price control and, of these, competition by government is
apt to be important. The Index will thus merely deflect the course of governmental
action.
V. PRICE CONTROL DURING THE DEPRESSION

The economic dislocations caused by the depression brought forth new sorts of
price control. Heretofore we have been concerned solely with efforts of government
to circumscribe economic power of one kind or another in such a way as to check
real oi fancied exploitation of the public. The measures may have taken the form
of direct price control or the indirect methods of the anti-trust laws but in all the
legislative purposes were the same. The objectives of the depression legislation to
be considered now were quite different.
New York State led the way with a statute of 1933 to fix the price of milk. An
investigation lasting nearly a year preceded legislative action. The importance of
the dairy industry in the agricultural economy of the state, the dependence of the
people on the continuance of an essential food supply and the serious threat to the
industry caused by the alarming price declines of 1931 and 1932, were all factors
that led the state to seek to rescue the industry by direct price fixing. The prices
received by the farmer for his milk had fallen below the cost of production and it
was this that the legislature sought to correct. The statute received the constitutional
42 STAT. 159 (1921), 7 U. S. C. §201.- See Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495 (1922).
'FED. TRADE CoMM'N, REPORT ON THE MEAT PACKING INDUSTRY (1918-1920).
'The constitutionality of this section ot the act was sustained in Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. U. S., 28o
U. S. 420 (1930).
'Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418 (1927).
'Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350 (1928).
Williams v. Standard Oil Co. 278 U. S. 235 (1929).
Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262 (1932).
"McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest (IJ3o) 43 HAiv. L. REV. 759.
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blessing of the Supreme Court but only by a close margin.98 The movement spread
rapidly into about a dozen other states 4 but the New York law expired by limitation in April, 1937 and has not been renewed. This will probably mark the end
of similar measures in the neighboring states.
9 was a
The National Industrial Recovery ActO5
similar rescue expedition but on a
much broader scale. It sought to deal with the ravages of a nationwide business
depression. In this broad objective it played its part along with other measures for
relief and recovery. There was price fixing and price control in a variety of forms
in the N.R.A. codes of fair competition but the dominant purposes of the entire
effort were to put people back to work by shortening hours of labor, to increase general purchasing power by fixing minimum wages and to encourage collective bargaining as to wages above the minimum.9 6 If industry was to pay the increased cost
growing out of this program it demanded, and in a large measure received, various
forms of price control in the codes. These have been reviewed in detail elsewhere 7
and there is no need to run through the list again. It is noteworthy, however, that
the process of code making was predominaritly one of higgling and bargaining
between'government and the intereited parties with only a phantom mandate from
the Congress. It was in this haphazard fashion that the government found itself
embarked upon the most extensive effort at price control ever undertaken in this
country when the Supreme Court put an end to the whole enterprise.98 There is a
wealth of experience in the short history of the codes and much to be learned in the
field of economics and, of equal importance, in the determination of the limits of
effective public administration. As far as public law is concerned, the reproving
words of the Supreme Court addressed to the unbounded delegation of power by
the Congress should have a salutary effect. Hereafter we may look for Congressional
mandates that articulate a policy. It is a vain exercise to attempt to reconcile the
economics of the N.R.A. with the tenets of the anti-trust laws. In spite of the
deferential gesture of the Congress towards the earlier dogma we have it now on
high authority that in the codes as finally written there was a denial of the older
MNebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (i934). The conditions in the.industry as revealed in the
investigation that gave rise to this statute are fully set forth in the majority opinion in this case. The
original statute expired by limitation on March 31, 1934 but was extended for additional periods until
April, 1937. It was allowed to lapse on that date. Goldsmith and Winks, Price Fixing: From Nebbia to
Guffey (1936) 31 I... L. REv. 179.
'Laws of New York, Virginia, New Jersey and Pennsylvania are discussed in Note (1936) 2! CORN.
L. Q. 366. Price fixing laws were also found in the following states: Connecticut, GEN. STAT. (Cum.
Supp. 1933, 1935) c. 107a, §§796c-811c, 1933, 1935; Florida, Laws 1935, Vol. 1, p. 772; Massachuesetts,
Acts 1934, c. 376; Ohio, Owo GEN. CODE (Page, Supp. 1926-1935) §io8o; Oregon, Cone (Supp. 1935),
§41-2001; Rhode Island, Pub. Laws 1934, p. 64; Vermont, Pub. Laws 1933, c. 197, §4618; Wisconsin,
Laws 1933, c. 65.
W48 STAT. x95 (1933), 15 U. S. C. §703.
" For what must now be taken to be an authoritative statement of the background, objectives and
economic polities of this effort, see REPORT OF TH PREsIDEDT's COMMIrrEE oF INDUSTIAL ANALYSIS ON
ma NATIoNAL REcovERY ADMsNsIrMoA1.so,
(Feb. 17, 1937) c. I; see also LYoN et al., Tim NATIONAL
RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION (1935) C. II.
"TomoRsG,
PIUcE CONTOL DEVICES IN N.R.A. CODES (1934); LYoN et a, op. cit. supra note 96, c.
XXIII.

"Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U. S., 295 U. S. 495 (1935)-
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laws in many and important particulars and of these price control stands at the head
of the list. 99
The Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of I935"0 was, of course, directly traceable to the N.R.A. It was but a special code for a particular industry and as such
it provided for control of hours of labor, wages and prices. In the bituminous coal
industry labor cost amounts to about two thirds of the cost of producing a ton of
coal. 101 In this circumstance any force that determines the wage level will make
itself felt in the price level. The interdependence of the two is so great that any
control of the one will produce effects on the other. If the wage contract is to be
controlled then it is necessary to control prices in order that operators may be able to
pay the wages. If prices are controlled, the level at which they are fixed will largely
determine the kind of a wage contract that may be made. Government sought to
deal with both factors in the original act. Six Justices of the Supreme Court were
explicit in declaring that the Congress was without power to deal with the factor
of labor costs and four Justices were equally explicit in sustaining the power to deal
with the factor of prices. 10 2 Judicial utterances as to the separability or inseparability
of the provisions of the act dealing with these matters will have no effect on the
economics of the industry. However disappointed organized labor may be in the
outcome of the initial constitutional tilt the demand for price control still has its
support for the bearing of prices on wages is all important in the still depressed coal
industry. The new Bituminous Coal Act of 1937103 is the fruit of the demand for
price stabilization. It is an attempt to salvage what may turn out to be valid in
the second encounter with constitutional arguments. The debate as to the validity
of price control will not be cast in terms of the bearing of prices on wages but any
consideration of the legislative purpose must give an important place to the desire
to exert control over this vital factor in the process of writing a wage contract.
VI.

ACT
The Robinson-Patman Act' 04 is not an anti-trust law for, though it bears a
superficial resemblance to Section 2 of the Clayton Act'e 5 which it undertakes to
PRICE DISCRIM~INATION: THE ROBINSON-PATMAN

t' See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S

COMMITTEE, supra

loo49 STAT. 991 (1935), 15 U. S. C. §8o.

note 96, at 216 et seq.

0 "The interdependences of wages and prices is manifest. Approximately two thirds of the cost of
producing a ton of coal is represented by wages," per Mr. Justice Sutherland in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U. S. 238, 315 (1936).
' Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936).
" The text of the act appears in C. C. H., TRADE REGULATION SERVICE, Coal Regulation. It was
signed by the President in April, 1937. To the effect that organized labor supports the price control
provisions, see the statement of counsel for the United Mine Workers of America who had cooperated in
the drafting of the Act, as quoted in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Cardozo in the Carter Case,
298 U. S. at 336.
10449 STAT. 15a6 (1936), 15 U. S. C. iIt 3, 13a. Excellent discussions of the Act appear in Notes
(1936) 5o HARv. L. PLV. io6; (937)
46 YALE L. J. 447; (1936) 36 COL. L. REv. 1285. See also

%aluable discussions by 1-hillips, The Robinson-Patman Anti-Pice Discrimination Law and the Chain
Store, (r936) 15 HARV. Bus. REv. 62, and by the speakers at the symposium held by the Trade
Association Executives in New York City and published as CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS ON THE ROBINSONPATMAN ANTI-DscRIMINATION Acr (1936).

UZ38 STAr. 730 (194), 15 U. S. C. §13 . This section is discussed by the writer in Sales Policies and

Price Discrimination under the Clayton Act (i!32) 41 YALE L. J. 518.
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amend, both the forces that brought it about and its objectives are quite different. Nor
is it a legislative rescue expedition traceable to the depression. And, of course, it is
not a price-fixing measure though its general requirement that prices be non-discriminatory is characteristic of measures designed to control the charges of public
utilities. Its concern is with the marketing structure by which goods pass from the
producer to the ultimate consumer, and this sets it apart from earlier laws. Nationwide and regional markets have introduced great variety and complexity into marketing structures and in many instances the familiar lines separating manufacturer,
wholesaler and retailer have been broken. Chain organizations of many forms,
department stores, mail order houses and cooperative buying pools are all evidence
of basic change. The necessary functions are performed in different ways and are
often combined in one hand but wherever goods must pass from person to person
in this process the price paid for goods may be vital to the prosperity or even survival
of a given class of persons in the hierarchy of distribution. It is for this reason that
the Robinson-Patman Act takes a proper place in any discussion of price control by
law for it seeks to outlaw a price practice that is thought to constitute an unfair
advantage secured by the mass distributor, this relatively new colossus in marketing,
in the contest with the independent. It is an anti-chain store law and must take its
place in its legislative purpose with other measures of like import.1 0
In spite of this particular objective the Act is drawn in universals and these,
when examined in the particulars of a great variety of marketing problems,
prompted one able commentator to declare that there is "a lawsuit in literally every
word of it."'' 10 From this there is no dissent. Moreover, this fact has posed a difficult problem for the writer of this "survey" article which has been met only by a
rigorous selection of matter for discussion. In this process, a consideration of Section
3 of the Act has been eliminated. That section was the fruit of a legislative compromise. The Robinson-Patman Bill encountered a rival in the Borah-Van Nuys Bill
which subjected to criminal penalties certain discriminatory practices which were
comprehended by the provisions of the Robinson-Patman Bill. The contest between
the two measures was resolved by the inclusion of the Borah-Van Nuys provisions
in the Robinson-Patman Act as Section 3, a procedure which has bred a host of
interpretive problems. No prosecutions are known to have been instittited under
Section 3, and it seems clear that Section i, amending Section 2 of the Clayton Act,
will prove the significant provision of the new Act. Attention has therefore been
1 07
confined to it.
The Act declares that "it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in [interstate]
'For the political and commercial background and legislative history of the Act, see Ellison in CoNFERENCE PROCEEDIMS, supra note 104, Evans, Anti-Price Discrimination Act of ,936 (1936) 23 VA. L.
REv. 140-146. The original act was drafted by counsel for the United States Wholesale Grocers Asso-

ciation and was actively promoted as an anti-chain store measure hy that association.
1
'r Gordon in CONFERENCE PROCEzDNoS, supra note 104, at 21.
"' There will, however, be no reference to problems arising under subsections (c) (d) and (e) of
that section dealing with payment of brokerage and advertising allowances.
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commerce . . . either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality . . . where the effect of such
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce [up to this point the Act is substantially identical with
cld Section 2 of the Clayton Act but what follows is new] or to injure, destroy, or
prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the
benefit of such discrimination or with customers of either of them. . . ." It is at
once apparent that, like old Section 2, it is not every discrimination in price that is
outlawed but only those that produce the specified effects on competition. There
are, then, two questions to be asked and each must be answered in the affirmative
in order to find a violation of the Act. Has there been a price discrimination? Has
it produced at least one of the effects specified in thd Act? These questions will be
taken up in order.
Strictly speaking there is a discrimination in price when there is any difference
in piice to any buyer for the dictionary tells us10 8 that to discriminate is to mark a
distinction, a difference, and when that is applied to price, any difference would
seem to be enough. The Act, however, mollifies somewhat the rigors of the dictionary in its other provisions. Thus, there is no discrimination in price within the
meaning of the Act unless the difference be as to "commodities of like grade and
quality." We merely learn from this that a seller may make a different price for
his shaving soap than for his bath soap and there is room for many interpretations
in the twilight zone of meaning of these words.
Also, there is no discrimination in price if the discrimination makes "only due
allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale or delivery resulting from
the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers
sold or delivered." This provision is of great importance and is pregnant with
lawsuitt. The straight quantity discount was an effective escape from the perplexities of old Section 2109 but now it may be justified only if it makes "only due
allowance" for differences in cost of manufacture, sale or delivery. The cost accountant will be called upon to develop a technique to make some showing of a cost
difference on which to base a price difference and the battle will be over the items
that may be included in the accountant's tables. The outcome will depend on how
exacting the courts turn out to be. 110 The words of the Act do not foreshadow the
iesult but the common sense of the judges is apt to call a halt to disputation when
some fairly approximate result has been reached for otherwise litigation might well
lose sight of the broad objective in a welter of the accountant's tables. The objectivewould seem to call for no more than some reasonable or approximate relation betwctn the schedule of quantity discounts and the savings in cost that the quantity
" The writer consulted WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1928).
"®Thispoint has been discussed by the writer, op. cit. supra note 1o5.
"The tpe of controversy that must inevitably arise is foreshadowed in the proceedings of the Federal
Trade Commission against the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. See GEORGE,
MIsno DECISION w THE GOODYEAR CAsE (Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 1936).
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sold or the method of sale may make possible. The quantity discount is thus
preserved to the mass distributor, and others too, but its preservation carries with
it the burden of relating it to some saving in cost. By calling a discount a quantity
discount the seller does not foreclose further inquiry for the assumption of the Act
is that a so-called quantity discount is not a quantity discount at all but is rather a
discriminatory price unless the seller is able to show that it reflects some saving in
cost."' Cost is thus the exclusive touchstone of the validity of this discount. A
112
host of practical problems will follow in the wake of this principle.
The functional discount is of long standing in marketing practice. It involves a
classification of the seller's customers according to the functions performed by
members of the class and the granting of a different discount to the different classes.
If a customer is classified as a wholesaler he ordinarily gets a more favorable discount than if he is classified as a retailer. There is, then, even in this simple case, an
obvious price differential and prima fade, at least, this is a price discrimination
within the meaning of the Act. The difficulties grow out of the fact that there are
no closed categories of wholesalers or of retailers, Wholesalers may be general or
short line; they may maintain warehouses and perform other services or they may
not; they may be large or small. Retailers may operate as local, regional or national
chains, or as mail-order houses or department stores and the method of operation
may involve the performance of functions otherwise performed by a wholesaler.
Retailers, too, may be large or small independents and as such they may be loosely
or closely organized into cooperative buying and service groups. In this way the
symmetry of a simple marketing structure is broken at many points. Functions
become blurred and the lines of competition are broken. In this situation there may
be many instances in which purchasers of a like quantity are sold at different prices
or even in which a purchaser of a greater quantity is sold at a higher price than
others for the functional discount, as such, takes no account of the quantity
purchased. The classification to be accorded a given purchaser or class of purchasers
will often bring to the forefront the struggle between the mass distributors and the
so-called legitimate outlets and on a shifting market scarcely any sales policy can be
worked out that will not involve some discrimination in the ordinary dictionary
meaning of the word. This, as we shall see, does not necessarily stamp it as unlawful but does suggest that it will be difficult to answer the first question, as to whether
there has been a discrinination in price, in anything but the affirmative." 81
"'This was in substance the position taken by the Federal Trade Commission in its proceedings against
the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. under old §2 of the Clayton Act. See George, supra note axo.
'Many of these are discussed in Notes (1936) 36 COL. L. REv. 1285, 1304; (1937) 46 YALE L. J.
447, 455. There is also the provision empowering the Federal Trade Commission to fix and establish
quantity limits which may not be exceeded but this depends on a finding that "available purchasers in
greater quantities are so few as to render differentials on account thereof unjustly discriminatory or
promotive of monopoly in any line of commerce," Robinson-Patman Act, §i (a).
'This analysis is based on the language of the Act and on a study of the comparable language of
old §2 and has been discussed with reference to available court decisions by the writer, op. cit. supra note
1o. Most commentators prefer to state that there is no "discrimination" within the meaning of the Act
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There are three other provisions that deserve brief mention. One deserves mention only that it may be dismissed. That is the provision that recognizes the right
of the seller to select his customers. One court" 4 thought that this might justify a
discrimination between customers selected but that seems wrong. It imports no
such thing. Another provision justifies price differentials as applied to sales of
perishables and seasonal goods, distress sales and sales of discontinued lines. The
last provision permits a seller to rebut a prima facie case of price discrimination by
showing that the different price was made "in good faith to meet an equally low
price of a competitor or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor." There
is dispute as to whether this merely establishes a rule of procedure or whether it
constitutes an absolute defense to a charge of discrimination." 5 Whatever the outcome may be there is nothing in the language to suggest that it makes any difference
whether the price being met is itself discriminatory or whether a discriminatory price
must be made to meet the other price. Without more specific language it is hard to
see how the courts can do more than apply it as it stands, no matter at what sacrifice
to the effectiveness of the Act, and the sacrifice would be great." 6
Assuming that a discrimination in price has been made out we come now to the
second question, has it produced at least one of the effects specified in the Act? One
of the proscribed effects is taken verbatim from old Section 2 of the Clayton Act
and that is where the effect "may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly" so that this comes into the new Act loaded with such meaning
as has already been given to it by the courts." 7 The other proscribed effects are
new and they are "to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who
either grants or knowingly" . receives the benefit of such discrimination or with
customers of either of them." There is here no requirement that there be a showing
of substantiality."' It is enough if competition is injured, destroyed or prevented
unless it has produced one of the prohibited effects. See Thurlow M. Gordon in CONFERENCE PROCEEDnote 104, at 23, 29; Note 0936) 50 HARv. L. REv. io6; Smith, The Patman Act in Practice
(1937) 35 MtcH. L. REv. 705, 708. These commentators generally quote the statement of Representative
Utterback in 8o CONG. REc. 9559 (June 15, 1936) to the effect that a "discrimination" is more than a
mere difference and implies some relationship between parties that entities them to equal treatment. It
seems to the writer that Representative Utterback's idea is taken care of by the requirement that, in order
to constitute a violation of the Act, the "discrimination" must produce certain effects on competition. It
is the disturbance of a relationship of competition that is important. It probably does not matter very
much which view is taken. The writer simply prefers to give the word "discrimination" its ordinary
meaning and direct attention to the effect of the "discrimination" on competition.
"'Mennen Co. v. F. T. C., 288 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 2d. 1923), cert. denied, 262 U. S. 759 (1923).
"See Notes 0936) 36 COL. L. R. 1285, 1311; (1936) 50 H~tv. L. REv. 1o6, 117; Thurlow M. Got- don in CONFERENCE PROCEED NcS, supra note 104, at p. 33.
""One must not be too dogmatic on this point, however, and commentators foresee the possibility
that the contrary view may be taken. See note 115, supra.
"t This has been discussed by the writer, op. cit. supra note 1os.
The presence of this word is puzzling. It is thought to be inadvertent in Note 0937) 46 YALE
L. J. 447, 450. In Note (1936) 50 HAtv. L. REv. io6, io8, it is thought that it will have to be disregarded completely in order to avoid unintended consequences.
'It may be said that under old §2 of the Clayto;n Act the requirement of substantiality was met by
a showing, without more, of injury to a particular competitor and Sidney-Morris & Co. v. National Ass'n
IhGS, supra
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and, of these, injury is the most susceptible of proof and therefore the most drastic
from the point of view of the seller. 120 The courts will have to fashion some
specification of the kind and degree of proof required to show injury to competition
and the task will not be easy for if the injury is caused in any field of competition,
whether of the vendor, the vendee or even of the sub-vendee, that is enough. If this
provision is given a literal application it will require the seller so to fashion his price
policy that it will not produce injury to competition at any step in the process of
getting his product to the consumer. When the seller is charged with responsibility
for the consequences of his own price policy in the field of competition in which he
and his vendees are engaged, there can be no complaint but when to this is added
responsibility for the policies of his vendee it would seem that this could not stand
without some showing of complicity of the vendor with his vendee. Without
this there is a bare attempt to fasten responsibility on one for the acts of another
whom he cannot control or direct but with it there is a division of responsibility
among those who caused and made possible the forbidden discrimination. The rigors
of even such a temperate construction of the Act may well cause the courts to be
exacting iii requiring proof of a causal relation between the price discrimination
and the fact of "injury" to competition.
In all cases the effect must be on "competition" and here the courts will be required to draw in some way the lines that mark the fields of competition. This will
be particularly troublesome where functions often performed by different persons
are absorbed into one hand. For example, is a retail chain store that buys direct
from a manufacturer in competition with an independent wholesaler? Is a cooperative buying pool of retailers in competition with an independent wholesaler when
it buys direct from the manufacturer? Many more such questions will arise in the
121
administration of this act and space does not permit of their discussion.
This much, however, may be said. The salvation of functional discounts and of
other practices of long standing in trade will depend upon the conclusions reached
by judges on the many and important questions that will arise under the Act. This
result is foreshadowed by the provisions for its enforcement. The Robinson-Patman
Act is an amendment to Section: z of the Clayton Act and, as sfich, it is enforceable
by the same diverse methods. Two agencies of the government are expressly charged
of Stationers, 40 F. (2d) 620 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930), points to that result. That case, however, involved
the threatened elimination of the competitor. Query whether the "injury" contemplated under the new
law will have to go that far. Cl. Evans, supra note zo6, at x1.
There is analogy in §4 of the Clayton Act permitting a suit for treble damages to be brought by
any person "who shall be injured in his business . . ." by reason of any violation of the anti-trust laws.
In treble damage suits the Supreme Court has insisted on a definite showing of a causal connection between the.wrong and what the court called "the fact of damage" but when this has been shown proof
addressed to the quantum of damage need not be strict. See Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment
Paper Co., 282 U. S. 555 (931); American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F. (ad) 763 (C. C. A. 7th
193o), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 899.

'"Many possibilities are discussed in Note (x936) 36 CoL. L. REv. 1285, 1294-1297, and it is predicted that a requirement of substantiality will be read into the Act. With this the writer concurs.
This is a familiar device of the courts in dealing with anti-trust laws.

PRICE CONTROL BY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

with its enforcement. The Attorney General may proceed by bill in equity in the
District Court to prevent and restrain violations.' 22 The Federal Trade Commission
may proceed by the issuance of a complaint followed by the steps that govern other
proceedings by the Commission. 2 3 In addition, private parties may bring suits to
recover statutory treble damages or may seek injunctive relief against threatened
loss or damage.' 2 4 It is plain that in proceedings initiated by the Attorney General
or by private parties the judges alone will be called upon to develop the meaning of
the Act. The part played by the Commission in proceedings initiated by it will be
no greater under this amendment to Section 2 than it was under the original section.
The meaning of the original section was always a question of law for the judges. 125
The result is that the rules of trade will be judge-made and it is apparent that the
general words of the Act point only in a general direction and not to a particular
result in a concrete case. Under the Act there is transferred to the judges a broad
discretion in influencing important marketing policies and, if it should turn out
that the judges are not expert in these matters, the blame must rest on the lawmakers who made such a law as this.
In view of its relatively limited objective the Act is hard to understand. It applies
to all sellers and is drawn in language that will give but little assistance to the
judges in resolving important conflicts over marketing policies and practices. It
draws within its ambit matters that lie outside the particular objective of the Act.
It is another example of legislation in universals in a field in which, as the Act only
too abundantly shows, universals are difficult to formulate and if applied indiscriminately may produce unsought consequences. It will be years before the products of the judicial process will be susceptible of formulation into any usable pattern
of sales policies. The habits of mind that prevail in the courtroom are ill adapted
to the difficult task of giving meaning to the vagaries of this legislative product.
Flexibility in the formulation and application of rules as to price poliEies would
seem to be a more workmanlike procedure. 126 Policies and practices vary from in'Clayton Act, supra note 105, §15.
=id. §x1. Under this section the Commission is required to hold a hearing on the complaint and if
a violation of the Act is found, it must make a report in writing stating its findings of fact and shall
then issue a cease and desist order. If the order is violated the Commission may apply to the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the enforcement of its order or the person against whom it is directed may obtain
a review on a similar application. In either event there must be filed in court a transcript of the entire
record before the Commission and the Act recites that "The findings of the Commission . . . as to the
facts, if supported by testimony, shall be conclusive," but the courts have always reached their own
conclusions on the record as to the construction of the Clayton Act. See Mennen Co. v. F. T. C., 288
Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923), cert. deiied, 262 U. S. 759 (1923); National Biscuit Co. v. F. T. C.,
299 Fed. 733 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924), cert. denied, 266 U. S. 6Z3 (1924), for the only two cascs to reach
the courts involving Commission proceedings under §2.
Clayton Act, supra note 105, §4, 16.
'It is notable that a large number of the cases under the original Section 2 were private suits for
treble damages or injunctive relief. See especially the important cases of Van Camp & Sons v. American
Can Co., 278 U. S. 245 (1929), and American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., supra note 2o.
"There is one provision for flexibility in the power granted to the Federal Trade Commission to fix
oyantity limits for quantity discounts uuder certain conditions (see note X12, supra) but this deals with
only a small part of the field covered by the Act.
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dustry to industry and without understanding and study of the conditions under
which a given rule must operate and its probable consequences, rule-making is
apt to be crude and clumsy. Judicial inaptitude is, then, but the penalty for legislative inaptitude. "Common sense," to use the expression of the Supreme Court in
a notable opinion, 12 7 requires that if this power of control is to be exercised at all it
be vested in an administrative body empowered to legislate for the particulars of a
given trade or industry.
VII. THE
The Fair Trade Acts

128

"FAIR TRADE" MOVEMENT

partake of the economic motivation of the Robinson-

Patman Act. They are simply different legislative manifestations of similar forces.
We have noted that the impulse for the Robinson-Patman Act came from the effort
of the independents in the marketing structure to deprive the mass distributor of a
competitive advantage attributed to special prices that the independents were unable
to secure. The Fair Trade Act is concerned primarily with retail trade.1 "9 It casts
the protecting manile of the state around one class of retailer, he who will sell goods
for not less than the price stipulated by the producer of the goods. All other retailers,
be they mass distributors or fellow independents, are branded as unfair competitors.
In the language of the trade, they are "price cutters."
In the typical statute' 30 the legislative mantle does not cover all goods but only
those that bear the "trade-mark, brand, or name of the producer" and that are "in
fair and open competition with commodities of the same general class produced by
others." With these limitations the statutory scheme permits, and it is only permissive, the producer to fix the price at which his goods shall be sold at each step in
the process of getting them into the hands of the consumer. When the producer
has set up this contractual marketing structure all others who have notice of it must
18 1
conform even though they are strangers to the contractual arrangement.
It must be left to the economist and business man to debate the economic merits
and demerits of resale price maintenance. That there is much to be said on both
sides is evidenced by the vast literature that this subject has called forth.13 2 The
courts, both state and federal and under both state and federal anti-trust laws, have
generally, though not universally, tagged agreements such as may be made under
"

J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928).

'The laws of the thirty-one states now having Fair Trade Acts are conveniently collected in C. C. H.,
TRADE RaGuA.-ToN SERVICE, Vol. 1, State Fair Trade Acts.
'This is not to say that these acts do not apply equally to sales at wholesale and otherwise. The
statement in the text is made to direct attention to the primary legislative objective.
'h The California Act which has been so widely copied is used in the analysis that follows. See Cal.
Stat. 1931, c. 278, p. 583; CAL7GEN. LAws (Deering, 1931) no. 8782, as amended by Cal. Stat. 1933, c.
260, p. 793.

'The constitutionality of the Illinois and California Fair Trade Acts has been sustained. Old Dearborn
Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 57 Sup. Ct. 139 (1936); The Pep Boys, Manny, Moe and
Jack v. Pyroil Sales Co., 57 Sup. Ct. 147 (1936). Discussions of the problems that will arise under these
acts will be found in Notes (x936) 36 CoL. L. REv. 293; (936) 45 YAL. L. J. 672; Elliott, Fair Trade
and Resale Price Maintenance (936) io So. CAL. L. REv. x.

'm Most of it is cited in Note (1936) 36 CoL. L. REv. 293.
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the Fair Trade Acts as in "restraint of trade" and under the guise of the compulsion
of these and other non-compelling words the judges have taken sides in the debate. 133
In 1933 the California legislature started a movement in the opposite direction when
it put teeth into its 1931 Fair Trade Act and set up a statutory scheme which, at this
18 4
writing, has been copied in thirty-one states and the end is not yet.
Things like this do not just happen and we nmr.st go back to trace the forces that
brought about this epidemic of laws. If the distributors of Dr. Miles' medicines in
,9t1 l 5 sought the protective mantle of his contracts it was only to protect themselves against their fellow independents who cut prices. In the years that followed
the mass distributor became an even greater threat to the position of the "legitimate"
distributor. The Federal Trade Commission made this clear in 1929 and in later
reports.1 36 The producer too, the Commission found, would be glad to have this
contractual arrangement made available to him. It looked for a time during the
192os as though there might be a Congressional reversal of the position taken by
the court under the Sherman Act' 37 but it remained for the ubiquitous N.R.A. to
codify the demand of organized retailers into a provision outlawing price cutting
"below cost."13 The code served to crystallize the demand of retailers for protection against the ever present "price cutter" and the ever growing mass distributor
whose disturbances were all the greater in the disorderly markets during the depression. But experience under the cost protection principle of the code-was unsatisfactory and the goal of a stable retail market seemed more likely to be reached if
resale prices could be fixed and maintained. Attention was shifted to this device
and it has been under this new sponsorship of organized retailers that the movement
for Fair Trade Acts has spread so rapidly and so successfully. 13 9 . As such it bears
but a superficial likeness to the struggle over Dr. Miles' contracts in 1911. And it
is under the same sponsorship that the movement in the present Congress to remove
resale price agreements from the prohibitions of the Sherman Act has a vitality that
40
was lacking in earlier efforts to the same end.1
There has also been an epidemic, though a less virulent one, of Unfair Practices
"sAuthorities will be found collected in Note (936) 45 YALE L. J. 672.
':'Supranote x28.
ImDr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911), is the leading case in which the
Supreme Court declared a contractual resale price arrangement to be in violation of the Sherman Act.
'FED.
TRADE COmm'N, REPORT ON REsx.a PRICE MAINTENANCE (1929), Pt. I, p. XI1, c. VI.
In
response to a Senate Resolution of 1931 the Commission submitted 33 factual reports on various phases
of chain store operations and practices. The story of the growth of chain stores is told in Fed. Trade
Comm'n, Growth and Development of Chain Stores, SEN. Doc. No. 1oo, 72d Cong., ist Sess. (1932).
'The course of these measures is reviewed in SELIGMAN AND LovE, PRICE CuTrING AND PRICE
MAINTENANCE (1932).
'See
General Code of Fair Competition For the Retail Trade, Art. IX, i(c), Art. VIII.

These
prohibited price cutting below cost and the use of "loss leaders."
An outstanding discussion of the forces that brought about the California Fair Trade Act and
experience under it is presented in Grether, Experience in California with Fair Trade Legislation Restricting Price Cutting (1936) 24 CAsIF. L. REv. 640.
See also Grether, Solidarity in the Distributive Trades in Relation to the Control of Price Competition,
infra, p. 375. ED.
"The Miller-Tydings bill, H.R. 1611, is now pending in the Congress.
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Acts and they are part and parcel of the same movement. At this writing ten states
have such laws. 14 1 For the typical act we again turn to California for in x935 that
state refashioned its earlier laws 14- and produced the act that has been substantially
copied in the other states. The Fair Trade Acts, as we have seen, permit vertical
control of the price of trade-marked goods but, while horizontal control is expressly
denied in those acts, it is evident that effects will be felt in the horizontal price level.
The great objective is, after all, a stable retail market and that means one in which
neither the mass distributor nor the "price cutter" shall, by his practices, gain what
is deemed an unfair advantage. The Unfair Practices Act is directed at the horizontal
level of prices and, unlike the Fair Trade Act, it applies to all goods. Its most novel
and important provision prohibits sales below "cost," and that term is defined, "for
the purpose of injuring competitors and destroying competition." Another provision
outlaws price discrimination "with the intent to destroy ... or to prevent the competition of any person" but this precursor of the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts
has long been familiar in state and-trust laws.' 48 Secret rebates, refunds, unearned
discounts, and the like, are prohibited in another section.
The cost protection principle of tlis act is but the provision of the N.R.A. Retail
Trade Code14 4 in a new dress and it is directly traceable to it. The new dress is
the provision that the sale below "cost!' must have been made "for the purpose of
injuring competitors and destroying competition." There will be troubles enough
in determining "cost' 45 and when to this is added the showing of purpose it is
evident that there is more of hope than of realization in this act. Only the most
liberal judicial notions as to the requisite showing of the condemned purpose will
make of this act an effective and usable instrument. If the judges can be persuaded
to accept, without more, the fact of sales below "cost" as sufficient evidence of the
wrongful purpose then the act may serve to put a floor under retail markets 140 and
to this extent it will contribute to the maintenance of a vertical price established
under the Fair Trade Act. But if the judges are insistent upon a definite showing
'These Acts are collected in C. C. H., TRADE REOuLAZor SERvxcE, Vol. 1, State Anti-Trust Laws,for the following states: Arkansas (r937), California (i935), Connecticut (1935: limited to the retail
drug trade), Kentucky (1936), Louisiana (936: limited to the retail drug trade), Montana (1937),
Oregon (1937), South Carolina (1932), Tennessee (1937) and Wyoming (937).
The Arkansas, Kentucky, Montana, and Wyoming laws are copied from the California law. Oregon and Tennessee have introduced variations in the statement of the unlawful purpose or effect while Connecticut and Louisiana
have gone the whole way and prohibited sales below cost, as defined, without any requirement of a
wrongful purpose or effect.
'In
1933 California adopted a Sales Below Cost Act, Cal. Stat. 1933, p. 1280-1281, which. was
strengthened and incorporated in the Unfair Practices Act of 1935, Cal. Stat. 1935, C. 477, p. 1546. An
excellent discussion of experience in the drug and grocery trades under the California Act appears in
Grether, supra note 139, at 656-659, 685; see also Cupp, The Unfair Practices Act, (1936) zo So. CALIF.
L. REv. 18.
"Provisions prohibiting price discrimination will be found in the anti-trust laws of a great many
states. See C. C. H., supra note 141.
'"Supra note 138.
"Many of these troubles are discussed by Grether, supra, note 139, at 686-690, with particular
reference to the problem as to whether "cost" is to be an average or an individual figure and the pitfalls
of each alternative.
' In the hands of an aggressive trade association this may be accomplished. See id. at 656, and 685.
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of the wrongful purpose it is likely that the act will be a disappointment to its proponents. The troublesome phrase may have grown out of doubts as to the constitutionality of a flat prohibition of sales below "cost"'1 4 ' but experience may show that

the constitutional hurdle will have to be met directly if the objective is to be gained.
Our survey of price control by law has taken us through a great variety of measures undertaken at different times and with various particular objectives. If any one
thread runs through these measures it is that the price at which goods are sold and
services furnished to the public is a matter of public concern and, if need be, of
governmental action. The particular objective is quickly merged in a continuing
policy of control and as precedent grows on precedent it becomes more evident that
there is nothing sacrosanct about price. It affects'so many interests, those of producer, wage earner, distributor and consumer alike, that the power of control carries
with it a vast power over the economic and social destinies of the nation. Price itself
may be said to be "affectcd with a public interest," to resurrect a now outmoded
phrase. This has been the great objective of the measures we have reviewed.
Price is not an abstraction. It is a very real force in economic and social life and
it makes itself felt in a variety of ways. It may be a weapon of oppression of the
weak by the strong; or it may be a competitive weapon that has grown too strong
for those who wield it and, uncontrolled, may threaten the security of the industry
or trade on which weak and strong alike depend. And price is unruly, not easily
subjected to control by either government or private interests.
These considerations, and many others, are reflected in the measures that have
been adopted by government. In the great transportation and public utility fields
government has attempted to deal with price directly. In the great fields of industrial enterprise, trade, and agriculture government has sought to condition forces
that are thought to play an important part in its determination. In the first type
government has acted generally through an administrative body vested with broad
powers of control but in the second the typical instrument is the penal or civil
statute. The important statutes in this last field are but little more than broad
mandates to the judges that leave to them the difficult task of giving direction to important forces in our economic life as concrete cases come before them for decision.
In this process important questions of economic policy, unanswered by the broad
mandates of the statute, must await the contingencies and limitations of the litigated
case and years may pass before any answer is forthcoming. This must not be taken
as a pat plea for certainty and definiteness for that plea is apt to be vain and illusory.
It is a plea that government, if it is to act at all in these matters, fashion its instruments of control with morc sureness. There isno quarrel with the broad mandates
of the statutes for in tirn. there is strength and adaptability to new conditions. A
bill of particulars has little place in a statute in this field. It riay be a source of
""See Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U. S. 1 (1926). Connecticut and Louisiana are the
only states that have taken this constitutional chance. See note 141, supra.
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weakness and merely deflect the course of trade practices into other, and equally
undesired, channels. The quarrel is, rather, with the legislature that is content to
entrust its mandates to the judges alone who must deal with them only in terms of
the issues presented- in the course of particular cases involving particular parties. In
this process there is little opportunity for broad study of the consequences that may
follow from a choice that must be made among competing alternatives and when
the choice has been made the result may be a satisfactory solution of the particular
problem before the court but it may produce wholly different and unsought consequences in other industries and trades. There is instruction in the methods of
government when direct control of price is attempted. It is recognized that the
legislative process is unsuited to ordain the details of control and must limit itself to
a broad mandate to an administrative body. The important details of legislation
may then be written in orderly fashion by those whose sole responsibility is to give
meaning to the legislative mandate in the light of the varying conditions that may
be revealed after careful study, and there is opportunity to refashion and adapt as
experience points the way. There are equally cogent reasons why a similar instrument should be fashioned when other -and equally difficult controls are attempted in
the complicated and ever changing fields of industry and trade. Possibilities along
these lines are virtually untried and unexplored.

